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NPS Cross-Campus Integrated 
Study:  
Maritime Domain Protection 
in the Strait of Malacca
Outbrief 1 June 2005
 
Wednesday, 1 JUN 2005
NPS MDP Study Outbrief
Ingersoll Auditorium
0800-1600
Thursday, 2 JUN 2005
Breakout Sessions/Modeling Demo




NPS MDP Study 
Outbrief Schedule, 1 JUN 2005
0800-0815  Introductions
0815-0915  Background/Results
0930-1015  Cargo Inspection System (Land)
1030-1130  Cargo Inspection System (Sea)
1130-1230  LUNCH
1230-1330  Sensor System
1345-1445  C3I System





















– Increase Response Time
• Force Response














Back to the drawing 
board, and 6 months 
later…
 
Overall NPS MDP Study Insights
• Systems Engineering approach to 
MDP is critical
• Land Inspection required to counter 
WMD threat, but costly
• Current Force Response systems 
effective against some threats
 
NPS MDP Study System 
Insights
Sensors
• Current System is inefficient – better 
performance available at approximately same 
cost
C3I
• Common Operating Picture and Data Fusion 
Centers drive C3I performance
Force Response
• Current Sea Marshal program is effective
• Point defense is key to protecting merchant 
ships from attack
 
NPS MDP Study System 
Insights
Land Cargo Inspection
• Effective Cargo Inspection requires 
industry cooperation
Sea Cargo Inspection
• Enroute at-sea cargo inspections can be 
effective using current sensor technology, 





• Goals - Integration - Process
• Tasking - Requirements - Method
• Maritime Terrorism & Piracy
• Threat Scenarios
• Environment - CONOPS





Goals - Integration - Process
 
NPS MDP Study Goals
• Coordinate NPS cross-campus efforts 
in an integrated study to analyze and 
design an integrated architecture for 
Maritime Domain Protection (MDP) in 
PACOM.
• “Design a conceptual system of 
systems to defeat and prevent 
terrorism in the Maritime Domain.” – 
Meyer Inst. Memo to SEA-7 Students 9NOV04
 
NPS MDP Study Integration























*TDSI = Temasek Defense Systems Institute (SNP) 












































NPS MDP Study Timeline: 
6 Months
J ul J un













Nov 04 - Feb 05
Objectives Tree Phase
Apr 05 - May 05
Assembly Phase




J ul 04 - Oct 04
Preliminary Problem Study








Feb 05 - Apr 05
Modeling and Analysis Phase
6 months of focused study
 
Tasking - Requirements - 
Method
 
NPS MDP Study Tasking
MDP Group
“Design and assess integrated 
alternative architectures…for a coalition 
of nations, focusing on large ship 
security…in the Straits of Malacca.”
Total Maritime Inspection System 
(TMIS)
“Design and assess alternative 
architectures for cargo inspection to 
include a total ship inspection sub-
system…to prevent the use of a large 





- No answers to focus questions
- No Threat Scenario
- No Operational Concept
- No Mission Needs Analysis
- No Requirements or Performance Measures
Advantages:
- Few constraints = blank slate
- Focus on Approach and Analysis (transferable)
- Allowed focus on multiple threats 
- No single-point solution – flexible solution “tool”
 
NPS MDP Study 
Requirements
“Hard” Requirements
- Tasking Document only source
Top-Level Requirements & 
Objectives
- Derived from Tasking Document
- Analysis-based, plausible
- Iterative, amendable (“soft”)
 System-Level Requirements & 
Objectives
- Derived from Top-Level Requirements 
- Analysis-based, plausible
- Iterative, amendable (“soft”)
 
NPS MDP Study Solution
 Generic Solution
- Solution capabilities transferable 
w/modification
- Malacca Straits as “Use Case” 
Decision-Making/Assessment Tool
- Approach and analysis valid for any 
threat/location
- Model suite: Adaptable inputs
 Technology Focus
- Detailed, physics-based analysis (e.g. 
Sensors) 
- No Political – No Legal
- Idealistic – “what could be possible”
 





- No more than 5 years out from IOC
- At least Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 4:  
                       
Conceptual Design
- TDSI detailed design
- NPS thesis
“Technology component and/or basic 
technology 




In order to reduce the terrorist threat 
in the maritime domain:
• What is the most effective use of 
current resources?
• Where should resources be focused 




- Objectives         
 - Requirements    
 - Alternatives       
- Modeling           
- Optimization      
- Results              
NPS MDP Study: Method
MDP Architecture Performance

















MDP Problem Definition/Architecture Development
MDP Architecture Conclusions & Recommendations
 
Terrorism and Piracy 
in the Maritime Domain
 
Straits of Malacca:
 Highest Value Chokepoint
 

























Terrorism vs. Commercial 
Shipping
• OCT 2001- Gioia, Italy – Illegal cargo (stowaway) found
– Well-equipped container (bed, toilet, heater, water, laptop, sat-
phone)
– Airport security passes for JFK, Newark, LAX, O’Hare
• OCT 2002 – Gulf of Aden, Yemen – Small Boat Attack
– French crude oil tanker Limburg
– Small fast craft with 2 crew and 2500 lbs TNT
– Impact pierced both hulls and 8m of cargo hold
– Lost crude oil from number 4 starboard tank
– $45M damage cost
• MAR 2003 – Strait of Malacca – Ship As Weapon(?)
– Chemical tanker Dewi Madrim
– 0300: Boarded by 10 pirates via speedboat
– Disabled radio, steered vessel, altering speed, for ~1hour
– Departed with Captain and First Mate (still missing)
 
Maritime Domain Protection 
Efforts
• U.S. Lead Agencies
– U.S. Coast Guard (CONUS)
–  U.S. Navy (International)
• Over 100 Initiatives 
– U.S. and International 
–  Government Agencies
–  National Labs







 Threat Scenarios Used in MDP 
Study
- Assessed potential threats to shipping
- Identified representative threat scenarios
- Assessed current vulnerabilities to threat 
scenarios
- Determined potential solution alternatives & 
costs
- DM Tool:
- Probabilities of attack not specified (up 
to DM)
- If threat materializes, analysis useful




Threat to/from Large Ships:
• Small Boat Attack
- Gun/RPG attack
- Missile attack
- Suicide/remote control 
explosives
• Hostile Boarding/ 
Stowaway/Intentional
- Hostage taking
- Onload CBRNE weapon
- Ship as weapon (vs. port or 
ship)
- Scuttle ship in port/channel




- In bulk cargo
• Outside of Cargo
- Inside ship hold
- Outside hold above 
waterline
- Outside hold below 
waterline
#1 “Small Boat 
Attack” (SBA)
#2 “Ship as 
Weapon” (SAW)






















Neutralize – NLT 35m
Objective: Neutralize SBA >65m from Large 
Ship
Threshold: Neutralize SBA >35m from Large 
Ship






Neutralize – NLT 250m
Ship As Weapon Scenario
Objective: Neutralize SAW >500m from pier





Objective: Stop CBRN material >1000m from 
port








Small Boat Attack (SBA)
• Probable – Demonstrated
• Defeat 80% 
Other
• 24/7 – all weather
• System must be interoperable with external systems
• Daily System Operational Availability:
– 90% Full Mission Capable
– 99% Partial Mission Capable
*Defeat = Less than $100k damage
*Confidence Interval = 95%
Ship As Weapon (SAW)
• Probable – Proven capability
• Defeat 90% 
WMD - Nuclear
• Remote – Unlikely, but possible
• Defeat 60% (MDP Contribution to 
Counterproliferation Efforts)
 





Engage SBA by 250m from target
Neutralize SBA by 65m from target
Ship As Weapon
(SAW)
Engage SAW by 2000m from pier
Neutralize SAW by 500m from pier
WMD Detect CBRNE material prior to Critical 
Area
• Evaluate System Impact on Commercial Shipping
• Evaluate MDP System Cost




















N/A 0.8 – 3.6 ~0% 80%
Ship As Weapon $38-40 2.5 – 4.9 ~80% 90%




Regional High Traffic Density
Straits of Malacca
– 59,314 Ships per year (2001)
• 20,665 Tankers
• 3,086 LNG tankers
• Average 162 ships per day
– 30% of World trade
• $1.3 billion USD per day (2003)
Port of Singapore
– 133,385 ship arrivals per year (2004)
 





- Narrow straits (≤ 30 
nm)
- Highest traffic density
- Restricted 
maneuvering









Area of Regard (AOR)
 












































• Individual System Models
– Modular - No grand behemoth model




• Integrated System Architecture Models
– Interface requirements






• MOE 1 – Performance
– Does the system architecture defeat 
each attack with the required probability? 
• MOE 2 – Risk (Expected attack 
damage)
– What is the expected attack damage cost 
for each threat scenario?
 
• Metric 1 – Commercial Impact
– What is the expected cost to commerce over 
10 years (through 2016)? 
• Commercial System Procurement Costs 
• Commercial System Operating & Support Costs
• Commercial Delay Costs
• Metric 2 – MDP System Cost
– What is the expected MDP system cost over 10 
years (through 2016)?
• MDP System Procurement Costs
• MDP System Operating & Support Costs 
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Performance = Pr(WMD Found)












WMD Scenario – Commercial Delay
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Performance = Pr(Defeat Distance ≥ Minimum)



















































Performance = Pr(Defeat Distance ≥ Minimum)
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Architecture Model Results & 
Analysis
WMD Model
•109 Combinations (incl. As-
Is):
– 3 Land Inspection options
– 2 Sea Inspection options
– 3 Sensor options
– 3 C3I options
– 2 Force options
Ship As Weapon Model
•11 Combinations








Matching performance and cost for 
each combination gives 109 data 
points
Performance only – 









*Total System Cost = MDP & Commercial System Costs + Commercial 
Delay Costs 
Low-cost gain from 
adding Sea Inspection 
























MDP Overall Results – WMD Scenario
Combined Effects Show That Decreasing the Number of Ports of Origin with Land 
Inspection System Installed Decreases Cost Without Large Performance Penalty
• Decreasing Highest-Volume 
ports of origin using Land 
Inspection System reduces cost 
but performance stays above 
requirement


































• Land Inspection Alt 2 - has 
Land Inspection system 
installed in 16 ports
• Sea Inspection Alt 1
• Sensors Alt 1
• C3I Alt 2
 
MDP Overall Results
Ship As Weapon (SAW) Scenario
Alt 2 performance constrained by 
scenario – 5 nm notification of SAW 
attack
“Requirement”
Current System provides effective 
solution to SAW 
= Improvement possible on As-
Is  (e.g. better 
training/armament)
= Improvement when not 
constrained by scenario (e.g. 
10-nm notification)
Alt 1 meets requirement, but costly
 
MDP Overall Results - Ship As Weapon (SAW) 
Scenario:
Increasing Time Remaining After Sensing and Deciding on an 

























MDP Overall Results - Small Boat Attack (SBA) 
Scenario:
Low-Cost Alternatives Exist to Defeat 

























*Total System Cost = MDP & Commercial 
System Costs + Commercial Delay Costs 
 
NPS MDP Study Overall Insights
MDP
• Wide-ranging, extremely difficult, highly 
interconnected problem
• Systems Engineering approach critical
• No single solution – evolving threats & 
capabilities
WMD Scenario
• Adding Sea Inspection and improving Sensors 
& C3I capabilities give low-cost benefit
• Land Inspection required for large benefit, 
but costly
 
NPS MDP Study Overall Insights
Ship As Weapon Scenario
• “As-Is” system (Sea Marshals) effective
• Improving Sensor range (not C3I 
capability) gives low-cost increase in 
response time
Small Boat Attack Scenario
• Feasible cost-effective solutions exist
• Hardened Target required:
– Active point defense





Most effective use of current resources?:
WMD Scenario
– Focus on Sensors, C3I (all threats) and an 
enroute (minimum delay) Sea Inspection 
capability
Ship As Weapon Scenario
– Increase Sea Marshal training/armament
– Maintain rapid-response deployment force
– Implement procedure to determine COI hostile 
intent at or before 10nm
Small Boat Attack Scenario
– Minimal investment
– Randomly on load armed Sea Marshal escorts to 




Resource focus for future cost-
effectiveness?:
WMD Scenario
• Develop Land Inspection system for major ports
• Develop “Trusted Agent” shipping company 
certification process
Ship As Weapon Scenario
• Develop sensors to track large ships in AOR
• Extend rapid response force range 
Small Boat Attack Scenario











- Malacca Strait: 1 to 2, max 3
- South China Sea: 1 to 5
- Andaman Sea: 1 to 5
Water Temperature
- Isothermal
- Day: 88 deg F
- Night: 79 deg F
Shallow Depth
- Continental shelf
- Typically 40 to 60m
- Restricted maneuvering in Strait
Light Currents
- Fairly constant
- Average 1/3 to 2 knots
- Both directions, with winds
 
Straits of Malacca    
Stable Meteorological 
Conditions
High Relative Humidity 
- Mean: 84%
- Diurnal range: high 90’s to 60%




- Average annual rainfall: 92.8”
  (Reference: South Florida 56”)
- No distinct wet or dry season.
Ducting (RF prop. 
>3GHz)
- Surface based ducting: 15-20% of 
time
- Evaporation ducting: Continuous
Uniform Temperature
- Average maximum: 88 to 93 deg 
F
- Average minimum: 73 to 79 deg F
- Extremes: 67 and 101 deg F
 
Uniform Pressure
- Diurnal pressure variation: 4 hPa
- Extremes: 1002.0 hPa and 1016.9 
hPa
Prevailing Winds
- DEC to APR: from SE




- 50m and up (COLREGS)
“Small Boat”
- 7m to 49m (COLREGS)
- 0 – 50 kts








– 7m  inflatable boat with 75hp outboard motor 
– 1,000 lb of TNT with a remote detonator.
• Environment:
– Daytime (≈1300hrs)
– Sea State 2 with 3-5 ft waves and winds less than 20 
kts
– Temp 90°F with 98% Humidity 
• Setting: 
– Small boat exits from the cove near Pulau Assan and 
rapidly approaches the Sea Lanes. 
– There are currently seven large ships and 34 small 
ships in the immediate vicinity (<2nm).
– The small boat is maintains a high rate of speed (30 
kts) toward the largest ships, and is unresponsive to 
VHF hails. 




– “Ghost ship” loaded with crude oil
– Approaches Singapore with the intent of ramming pier
• Environment: 
– Nighttime with a pier side arrival time of 0200 hrs
– Sea State 2 with 3-5 ft waves and winds less than 20 kts
– Temp 82°F with 90% humidity
• Setting: 
– Manifest in order, responsive to hails, accepts pilot onboard at 
normal pilot pickup point
– Follows all standard navigation restrictions for initial entry into 
Singapore
– Accelerates at breakwater
– Does not follow pilot advice, Harbor Control loses 
communications with pilot




– MAERSK Shipping vessel Dawn Treader is transporting a 20-kT 
Russian-made nuclear device through the Straits of Malacca to 
a final destination of Singapore.
• Environment: 
– Daytime (~0800 hrs)
– Sea State 3 with 6-10 ft waves and winds less than 25 kts
– Temp 87°F with 92% humidity
• Setting: 
– The Dawn Treader unknowingly loaded the illicit cargo at the 
port of Shanghais, China in a shipment of thirty-two 40’ 
shipping containers carrying Apple Ipods to Singapore. 
– All ship’s paperwork (including manifests) are legitimate, and 
in order. 
























“An adaptable, integrated systems 
architecture that neutralizes the threat of 
terrorism from the sea in the Malacca Strait 
by providing large ship security and 
detecting hazardous materials in the 
maritime environment.”
– Objectives include evaluating impact on commerce 













































3) Force Response System
4) Sea Inspection System



































































































1 - Pr(Land 
Inspect)
Performance = Pr(WMD Found)
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1 - Pr(Land 
Inspect)
Commercial Impact (Delay Cost) = Total Delay Time x Cost per 
Delay Time
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